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Compulsory licensing allows firms in developing countries to produce foreign-owned inventions without
the consent of foreign patent owners.  This paper uses an exogenous event of compulsory licensing
after World War I under the Trading with the Enemy Act to examine the long run effects of compulsory
licensing on domestic invention. Difference-in-differences analyses of nearly 200,000 chemical inventions














Compulsory licensing allows firms in developing country to produce foreign inventions without 
the consent of foreign patent owners.
1  Countries such as Brazil, Thailand and India have used 
the policy to procure life-saving drugs for millions of patients and are proposing it as a means to 
access foreign technologies to combat climate change.
2 Opponents of compulsory licensing, 
however, fear that the policy may reduce long-run access to critical innovations, as it weakens 
incentives to invent and transfer new technologies abroad.
3   
This paper examines an important aspect of compulsory licensing, which has been 
neglected in the policy debate: What are the long-run effects on domestic invention in countries 
that use compulsory licensing to access foreign technologies?  On the one hand, the ability to 
license foreign inventions at below-market rates may weaken incentives for domestic innovation.  
On the other hand, experience with producing foreign innovations may enable developing 
countries to build up their own domestic industries and in the long run increase domestic 
invention through learning by doing (e.g., Arrow 1962, Stokey 1995, Irwin and Klenow 1994) 
and other mechanisms.   
To identify the long-run effects of compulsory licensing on domestic invention, this 
paper takes advantage of an exogenous episode of compulsory licensing as a result of World War 
I.  In November 1917, Congress passed the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA).  Section 10 of 
the Act permitted U.S. firms to violate enemy-owned patents if they contributed to the war 
effort.
4  As the war dragged on, the TWEA became more and more punitive (Steen 2001, p.99).  
One week before the Armistice at Compiègne on November 11, 1918, Congress amended the 
TWEA to confiscate all enemy-owned patents; by February 1919, German-owned patents were 
systematically licensed to U.S. firms.   
                                                 
1 In general, TRIPS Art.31 allows compulsory licenses after negotiations for voluntary licenses have failed.  In cases 
of emergency, TRIPS allows governments to grant compulsory licenses without first trying to negotiate.  The World 
Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Declaration of 2001 emphasized developing countries’ rights to issue compulsory 
licenses: “Each member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds upon 
which such licenses are granted.” (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, Art. 5.b) 
2 Thailand and Brazil have used compulsory licenses to produce antiretrovirals for AIDS patients and India has 
indicated its plans to use compulsory licensing to combat swine flu (Kremer 2002, Galvão 2002, Gostin 2006, 
Steinbrook, 2007). 
3 The U.S. pharmaceutical company Merck criticized Brazil’s licensing of its HIV drug efavirenz as an 
“expropriation of intellectual property” that may in the long run “hurt patients who require new life-saving 
therapies” (Intellectual Property Watch, May 7, 2007).  Survey results and case studies, however, suggest that 
compulsory licensing does not provoke drastic reactions by affected firms (e.g., Scherer 1977, Chien 2003).  As a 
mechanism to address anti-competitive patenting behavior in domestic markets, compulsory licensing is expected to 
increase overall welfare by encouraging the optimal trade-off between incentives for R&D and the dead weight loss 
of long-lived patents (Tandon 1982, Gilbert and Shapiro 1990). 
4 12 U.S.C. § 95a.  Today, Cuba is the only country still affected by the TWEA.   2
To measure the effects of compulsory licensing, this paper compares changes in annual 
patents for chemical inventions by domestic inventors across technologies that were 
differentially affected by the TWEA.  This strategy allows us to control for alternative factors 
that may have encouraged domestic invention, such as improvements in education and scientific 
training (e.g., Landau and Rosenberg, 1992) or tariff barriers intended to protect the U.S. 
chemical industry (e.g., Eichengreen 1989, Irwin 1998).  Technologies are measured at the level 
of narrowly-defined subclasses of United States Patent Office (USPTO) patents.  Chemical 
inventions in all of these subclasses were affected by more general factors, such as tariffs and 
improvements in education, but only some subclasses were affected by compulsory licensing.  
Specifically, subclasses are defined as treated if a domestic firm was issued a compulsory license 
for one of 699 enemy-owned chemical patents under the TWEA.   
In addition to distinguishing subclasses with and without treatment, we measure the 
effects of variation in the intensity of treatment.  Specifically, we control for differences in the 
number of licensed patents across subclasses and in the novelty of licensed patents.  
Changes in the domestic invention are measured by the number of U.S. patents granted to 
domestic inventors per subclass and year.  To construct the data, we collected information on all 
21 USPTO classes of organic chemicals that received at least one license under the TWEA.  
These 21 classes produced a total of 165,400 patents between 1875 and 1939 and covered 8,422 
subclasses; 335 of these subclasses received at least one license under the TWEA.  
OLS regressions reveal substantial increases in domestic invention in subclasses that 
were affected by compulsory licensing relative to other subclasses after the TWEA.  In 
subclasses that received at least one license, domestic inventors produced an average of 0.118 
additional patents per year after the TWEA, implying an increase of nearly 20 percent, compared 
with an average of 0.684 patents per subclass between 1919 and 1939.  Each additional license 
generated 0.062 additional patents per subclass and year; in subclasses where U.S. firms licensed 
patents that were 10 years younger (i.e., more novel), domestic inventors produced 0.060 
additional patents per year.   
In addition to estimating the overall impact of compulsory licensing, we also examine the 
timing of these effects.  This is important because, among other things, it may help shed some 
light on the mechanisms by which licensing encourages invention.  If licensing increases 
invention through learning by doing, effects may take several years to materialize, as domestic   3
firms learn to produce foreign inventions and build their own production capacities.  This 
process might be especially slow if domestic inventors need “time to learn,” as Arora and 
Rosenberg (1998, p.79) suggest to have been the case for organic chemicals in the United States, 
where initial levels of domestic invention were low.
5  In fact, we find that pre-TWEA levels of 
domestic invention were especially low in treated subclasses. 
Estimates of annual treatment effects confirm that the full impact of compulsory licensing 
took several years to materialize.  Enemy-owned patents were licensed from 1919 and 1924, with 
most licenses being granted in 1920 and 1921 (Steen 2001, p.100).  Although annual treatment 
effects become significant as early as 1927, the strongest effects occur for patents that were 
granted after 1931.  Given that patent applications occur two to three years before grants in our 
data, this implies that the largest effects on applications began in 1929 – eight to nine years after 
most patents had been licensed.  Once the effects were established, they remained large and 
significant (at nearly 60 percent additional patents per subclass and year) throughout the 1930s. 
One caveat with these results is that the licensing decisions of U.S. firms may not have 
been exogenous, even though the timing of the TWEA and the types of technologies that were 
available for licensing were exogenous.  For example, U.S. patent data for the pre-period indicate 
that U.S. inventors were most likely to license in subclasses where levels of domestic invention 
were initially low.  In those subclasses domestic invention is likely to have increased more 
slowly because U.S. firms had more catching up to do before they could create their own 
inventions.  As a result, OLS estimates may underestimate the true effects of compulsory 
licensing.  On the other hand, U.S. inventors may have been more likely to license in subclasses 
where the demand for domestic invention was high, and invention in those subclasses may have 
increased more quickly (independent of the TWEA).  In that case, OLS would overestimate the 
true effects of compulsory licensing.  
To test for these potential problems, we subject the data to a series of robustness checks.  
Triple difference regressions account for unobservable characteristics that may have encouraged 
                                                 
5Also see Haber 1971, pp.205-206, Aftalion 1991, p.144, Mowery and Rosenberg 1998, p.75.  In 1923 chemical 
trials during a court case established that a skilled U.S. chemist could not reproduce synthetic organic chemicals 
based on confiscated German patents: Louis Freedman, who had earned degrees from Yale and Columbia proved 
unable to produce cincophen, a drug to treat gout (Steen 2001 pp.91-92, 114-115).   Additional delays may result 
from incomplete information in patent documents.  The German firm BASF, for example, withheld critical 
information about the Haber-Bosch process from its patent application and U.S. firms took nearly a decade to 
replicate its process (Haynes 1945, pp.86-87).  We discuss these factors in more detail in the section on the historical 
background of the TWEA.   4
patenting by all non-German inventors in treated subclasses.  Specifically, we compare changes 
in patenting by domestic inventors with changes in patenting by other non-German inventors 
before and after the TWEA.  Triple difference estimates confirm that licensing encouraged 
patenting by domestic inventors, even relative to other non-German inventors.  An alternative 
placebo test artificially exposes French inventors, who could not license enemy patents under the 
TWEA to “treatment” by compulsory licensing.  In this placebo test, compulsory licensing has 
no effect.   
To assess the direction and size of selection bias, we estimate intent-to-treat (ITT) and 
instrumental variable (IV) regressions, where the number of enemy-owned patents that U.S. 
firms could have licensed under the TWEA measures the ITT and IV variables.  ITT estimates 
are slightly smaller than OLS estimates, while IV estimates are somewhat larger, which indicates 
that selection bias (such as the concentration of licensing in subclasses with low initial skill 
levels) may indeed lead us to underestimate the true effects of compulsory licensing.   
Additional robustness checks include regressions that control for pre-existing time trends, 
regressions that control for variation above the subclass level, regressions on a restricted sample 
of primary subclasses, regressions for changes in patenting within a specific chemical (indigo 
dyes), and placebo tests to check for random correlation.  
In a final section of the paper, we perform a firm level analysis to shed some light on the 
mechanism by which compulsory licensing encourages invention.  Specifically, we distinguish 
the effects of patents that were licensed to a specific U.S. firm (Du Pont) from the effects of 
patents that were licensed to other firms.  Effects of own licenses are more likely to result from 
learning that occurs when a firm produces foreign inventions, while other licenses capture factors 
that benefit the industry more broadly, such as improvements in skills and knowledge spillovers 
across firms.  Our results suggest that both types of mechanisms were important, but effects of 
own licenses were roughly four times as large as effects of other firms’ licenses.  These estimates 
are comparable to results for the late 20
th-century, which find that within-firm learning effects 
are about three times as large as effects of knowledge spillovers across firms (Irwin and Klenow 
1994). 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  Section I summarizes basic features 
of the TWEA.  Section II presents our empirical strategy.  Section III details the data collection 
and discusses potential sources of bias and measurement error.  Section IV presents estimation   5
results, Section V robustness checks, and section VI summarizes results of our firm-level 
analysis.  Section VII concludes. 
 
I. The TWEA as a Natural Experiment of Compulsory Licensing 
  Created by an Act of Congress on October 6, 1917, the TWEA was intended to “dislodge 
the hostile Hun within our gates” (Alien Property Custodian 1919, p.17) to destroy “Germany’s 
great industrial army on American soil,” its “spy centers,” and “nests of sedition” (Alien 
Property Custodian 1919, p.14).  To this end, the TWEA placed all enemy property “beyond the 
control of influence of its former owners, where it cannot eventually yield aid or comfort to the 
enemy” (Alien Property Custodian 1919, p. 13).
6    
On March 28, 1918, the TWEA was amended to give the Custodian the power to sell 
enemy property, including all enemy-owned patents “as though he were the owner thereof” 
(Alien Property Custodian 1919, p.22).  Thus, the Alien Property Custodian began to appropriate 
any patent owned by “enemy persons” and corporations doing business in Germany, Austria-
Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, as well as the occupied parts of Belgium, France, Russia, and 
the Balkans (Alien Property Custodian 1919, p.7), administering these properties as a trust.   
By February 22, 1919, Mitchell Palmer, the Alien Property Custodian and President of 
the Bureau of Investigation (today’s FBI) felt comfortable to say that “practically all known 
enemy property in the United States has been taken over by me and is administered according to 
the provisions of the trading with the enemy act” (Alien Property Custodian 1919, p.7); 35,400 
reports of alien property had been received, and 32,296 trusts had been created, with a total value 
exceeding $500 million in 1919, equivalent to 4.7 billion in 2008 (Appendix Table A1).
7  
At the time of the TWEA, the U.S. organic chemical industry was largely based on 
natural, wood-based products, and lagged behind in more complex processes, including organic 
synthesis (e.g., Aftalion 1991, pp.117-119, Arora and Rosenberg 1998, p.74).  In these areas, 
                                                 
6 The destruction of German property was also intended to prevent Germany from starting another war: “…the great 
overshadowing result which has come from this war is the assurance of peace almost everlasting amongst the 
peoples of the earth.  It would help to make that an absolute certainty by refusing to permit Germany to prosecute a 
war after the war... if she can get out of the war with her home territory intact, rebuild a stable government and still 
have her foreign markets subject to her exploitation, by means no less foul and unfair than those which she has 
employed on the field of battle, we shall not be safe from future onslaughts different in methods….” (Alien Property 
Custodian 1919, p.16)  
7 Using the GDP deflator as a conservative measure; based on relative shares of GDP, the 2008 equivalent would be 
$88 billion (Williamson 2008).   6
foreign patentees dominated U.S. markets.  For example, 70 percent of all U.S. patents for 
synthetic organic compounds between 1900 and 1910 were granted to German firms (USTC 
1918, Haynes 1945 p.214, Steen 2001).  World War I temporarily suspended German 
competition, but German firms swiftly returned to their U.S. markets and resumed patenting in 
the 1920s (Figure 1).   
The TWEA granted U.S. firms access to all patents that had been owned by enemies 
during the war.  On behalf of the U.S. government, the Chemical Foundation began to issue non-
exclusive licenses of enemy patents in 1919.
8  Licensing continued until 1926 though most 
licenses were granted in 1920 and 1921 (Steen 2001, p.100).  
 
II. Empirical Strategy 
Our empirical strategy compares changes in domestic invention between 1875 and 1939 
across chemicals that were differentially affected by the TWEA.  The dependent variable is the 
number of patents by U.S. inventors per USPTO subclass and year: 
 
Patents by U.S. inventorsc,t = α0 +ß’ TREATc ⋅  postTWEAt + γ ⋅ Zc,t + δt + fc + εc,t 
 
where TREAT is a vector of treatment variables and postTWEA equals 1 for every year after 
1918.  In our most basic specification, we define a subclass as treated if it contained at least one 
enemy-owned patent that was licensed to a U.S. firm.  The control variable Z measures the total 
number of foreign patents; it controls for unobservable factors, such as technological progress 
within subclasses; δ indicates year fixed effects and f subclass fixed effects.
9   
 
A. Controlling for Differences in the Intensity of Treatment 
We extend the basic difference-in-differences framework to include two additional 
variables to measure the intensity of treatment.  First, we control for the number of patents that 
were licensed in each subclass.  Most subclasses received only one license under the TWEA, but 
                                                 
8 In 1921 the Chemical Foundation owned 4,764 patents, 874 trademarks, and 492 copyrights.  Although licenses 
were sold below market rates, the foundation collected nearly $700,000 in royalties (ca. 7 million 2008$, using the 
GDP deflator).   
9 Fixed effects include estimates for,α1 and α2,from the standard difference-in-differences equation 
Patents by U.S. inventorsc,t = α0+ α1'TREATc+ α2⋅ postTWEAc + ß' TREATc ⋅ postTWEAt +γ ⋅ Zc,t +δt+ fc+εc,t In our 
simplest specification TREAT equals 1 if the subclass includes at least one licensed patent.  In specifications that 
control for the intensity of treatment TREAT is a vector of the number of licensed patents per subclass and the total 
years of remaining patent life of all licensed patents; these measures enter linearly and non-linearly in alternative 
specifications.   7
a small number of subclasses received many licenses (Figure 2).  Subclass 106/402 
“compositions: coating or plastic – lakes,” for example, received eight licenses.  Second, we 
control for the total remaining lifetime across all licensed patents to measure differences in the 
novelty of licensed patents across subclasses (Figure 3).  To illustrate such differences, compare 
an old patent that was granted in 1903 with a new patent that was granted 12 years later, in 1915.  
If both patents were licensed under the TWEA and if technologies improve over time, the old 
patent would become obsolete more quickly, and a license for the new patent conveys greater 
benefits to licensees. 
 
B. Measuring Annual Treatment Effects 
  In addition to average effects we estimate annual treatment effects to examine the timing 
of changes in domestic invention.  If compulsory licensing encourages invention through 
experience and learning-by-doing (e.g., Arrow 1967) the most significant changes should occur 
with some delay.  Low initial skill levels in licensing countries (which, as we will show below, 
may disproportionately affect treated technologies) and incomplete information in patent 
documents may create further delays.  At the time of the TWEA, the German chemical company 
BASF, for example, had “effectively bulwarked its discovery (of the Haber-Bosch process) with 
strong, broad patents which detailed meticulously the apparatus, temperatures and pressures, but 
cleverly avoided particulars as to the catalysts employed or their preparation” (Haynes 1945, 
pp.86-87).  As a result, a “prolonged learning experience was necessary to understand the two 
sides of catalysis, the chemical side and the engineering and design side.”
10  To measure the 
extent of such potential delays, we estimate annual treatment effects βt   
 
 Patents by U.S. inventorsc,t = α0 +ßt ⋅ TREATc ⋅ YEARpostTWEAt + γ ⋅ Zc,t + δt + fc + εc,t 
 
where βt  measures the differential change in domestic patenting between treated and untreated 
subclasses in year t after the TWEA. 
 
                                                 
10 Mowery and Rosenberg 1998, p.75 (citing Haber 1971, pp.205-206).  Additional delays may result from variation 
in business cycles, which constrain investments in R&D.  For example, personnel cuts during the recession of 1920 
deeply affected DuPont’s research team on dyestuffs, which already “had already been struggling with the burden of 
catching up with chemists in the German dye industry” (Hounshell and Smith 1988, p.89).  Between mid and end 
1920, the team’s salary roll fell from 565 to 217, so that “(r)esearch chemists washed their own dishes, ran their own 
errands and did all of the experimental work” (Hounshell and Smith 1988, p.89).    8
C. Comparing Pre-Treatment Trends for Treated and Untreated Subclasses 
A potential challenge to the difference-in-differences strategy is that differential changes 
between treated and untreated subclasses may be driven by pre-existing differences in the time 
trends of patenting.  To address this issue, we allow βt to vary across treated and untreated 
subclasses prior to the TWEA, using 1900 as the baseline and restricting the sample to pre-
TWEA years. 
 
Patents by U.S. inventorsc,t = α0 +ßt ⋅ YEARt ⋅ TREATc ⋅ pre1919t + γ⋅Zc,t + δt + fc + εc,t 
 
This test reveals no systematic differences in pre-trends across treated and untreated subclasses 
(Figure 4).   
 
D. Triple Differences and Placebo Treatments for French Inventors 
Another concern is that unobservable factors such as the temporary absence of German 
competitors from U.S. markets may have encouraged invention independently of the TWEA.
11  
If such increases differentially affected domestic invention in treated subclasses, they would lead 
us to overestimate the true effects of compulsory licensing.  To address this, we estimate triple 
difference regressions, which compare changes in annual patents by U.S. inventors with changes 
in annual patents by all other non-German inventors across treated and untreated subclasses 
before and after the TWEA: 
   
 Patentsn,c,t =  α0 + α1USAn + α2TREATc ⋅ YEARpostTWEAt + α3USAn ⋅ TREATc  
+ α4USAn ⋅ YEARpostTWEAt  
+ ßt ⋅ USAn ⋅ TREATc ⋅ YEARpostTWEAt + δt + fc + εc,t 
 
where the subscript n distinguishes U.S. and other non-German inventors, USA distinguishes 
patents by U.S. inventors, and βt
  measures the additional effect of compulsory licensing on U.S. 
inventors relative to other non-German inventors.   
An alternative test artificially exposes French inventors, who were also lagging behind in 
organic chemistry (e.g., Aftalion 1991), to a placebo treatment under the U.S. TWEA.  
Specifically, we re-estimate the basic specification with annual treatment effects under the 
                                                 
11 For example, historical accounts suggest that the absence of German competitors from overseas markets opened 
the field to integrated producers of dyestuffs from England, the United States, France, Japan, and Switzerland 
(Aftalion 1991, p.125).   9
counter-factual that French inventors, who could not take advantage of compulsory licensing 
provisions, did in fact benefit from them.  
 
Patents by French inventorsc,t = α0 +ßt ⋅ TREATc ⋅ YEARpostTWEAt + γ ⋅ Zc,t + δt + fc + εc,t 
 
If unobservables, such as the absence of German competitors during the war, caused U.S. 
inventors to patent more after 1919, French inventors should experience a similar increase.  
      
E. Intent to Treat and Instrumental Variable Regressions 
Perhaps the most important threat to our identification strategy is that the licensing 
decisions of U.S. firms may not have been exogenous, even though the TWEA itself and the 
technologies that U.S. firms could license were exogenous.  In fact, patent data indicate that 
subclasses where U.S. inventors chose to license were substantially different from other 
subclasses: U.S. firms were more likely to license in subclasses where initial levels of domestic 
invention were weak (Figure 5).  Under the TWEA, enemy-owned patents became available for 
licensing in 1,341 subclasses; the pre-TWEA share of domestic invention in these subclasses was 
85 percent.  U.S. firms chose to license in 335 of these subclasses; the pre-TWEA share of 
domestic inventions in these (treated) subclasses was 50 percent.  Thus, the data suggest that 
U.S. firms were more likely to license in subclasses where their pre-TWEA inventive capacity 
was weak.  As a result, the effects of compulsory licensing may have been delayed (which is 
consistent with the historical evidence), and OLS may underestimate the true effects of 
compulsory licensing.  
Intent to treat (ITT) regressions allow us to identify the direction of this selection bias 
(e.g., Imbens and Wooldridge 2009).  We define intent to treat as the number of enemy patents 
that were available for licensing under the TWEA.
12   
 
 Patents by U.S. inventorsc,t = α0 +ß ⋅ Enemy patentsc ⋅ postTWEAt + γ ⋅ Zc,t + δt + fc + εc,t 
 
                                                 
12 Specifically, we construct a list of all 4,767 enemy-owned patents that the Chemical Foundation had made 
available for licensing by 1922 (Alien Property Custodian 1922, pp.884-960). The alternative, binary, definition of 
ITT as a subclass that included at least one enemy patent would assign nearly 50 percent of subclasses to the ITT.  In 
the IV regressions, this binary treatment variable would consistently estimate the sign of the average per-unit 
treatment effect but over-estimate the size of the effect if treatment is continuous (Angrist and Imbens 1995; 
Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996).   10
An alternative test uses the number of enemy patents as an instrument for licensed 
patents.  Enemy patents is highly correlated with the number of licenses that were granted to U.S. 
firms, but variation in enemy patents (other than those that were licensed) should not by itself 
increase domestic invention.  
 
First stage:   Number of licensesc,t = η0+ φ ⋅ Enemy patentsc ⋅  postTWEAt +µt + gc + ωct 
 
Second stage: Patents by U.S. inventorsc,t = α0 +ß ⋅ Number of licensesc ⋅  postTWEAt    
                  +   δt + fc + εc,t 
  
F. Robustness Checks 
  In addition, we perform a number of alternative robustness checks, including regressions 
that control for pre-existing time trends, regressions that control for variation at the level above 
the subclass level, regressions on a restricted sample of primary subclasses, regressions within a 
specific type of chemicals (indigo dyes) and a series of placebo tests. 
 
III. The Data 
Our treatment variable consists of 699 enemy-owned chemical patents that were licensed 
to U.S. firms; the outcome variable includes all 165,400 U.S. patents in 21 USPTO (main) 
classes that received at least one compulsory license under the TWEA.   
 
A. Data on the Treatment: Licensed Enemy Patents   
  Under the TWEA, the United States confiscated over 4,500 enemy-owned patents for 
chemical inventions.  Of these patents, 699 were licensed by the Chemical Foundation to one or 
more of 326 U.S. firms from 1919 to 1926 (Haynes 1945).  Exact data on the grant dates of 
licenses are unavailable, although we know that most licenses occurred in 1920 and 1921 (Steen 
2001, p.100).  Licensed patents belong to 335 primary and secondary subclasses, which we 
define as treated.  Variation in the number of licensed patents across treated subclasses (Figure 2) 
and in the novelty of licensed patents (measured as the total remaining years of patent life for all 
licensed patents in a given subclass, Figure 3) allow us to control for the intensity of treatment.   
 
B. Data on the Outcome: U.S. Patents 1875-1945   11
Domestic invention is measured as the number of U.S. patents by domestic inventors per 
subclass and year.  We have collected these data for all 21 USPTO classes of chemicals that 
received at least one dyestuff license under the TWEA (Appendix Table A2).  Between 1875 and 
1945, these 21 classes generated 165,400 patents, which we collect from the USPTO official 
website (www.uspto.gov).  These patents cover 8,422 subclasses, 335 of which are treated.  
Ideally we would measure changes in domestic invention based on the application (rather 
than grant) dates of U.S. patents.  Because data limitations only allow us to measure grant dates, 
we estimate the length of the lag between patent applications and grants.  In a sample of 493 
dyestuff patents between 1930 and 1933, the median patent is granted three years after the 
application (with a 25
th percentile of two and a 75
th percentile of four years).
13  
Patents by domestic inventors are measured by subtracting foreign patents from the total 
number of U.S. patents per year.  Foreign patents are U.S. patents by inventors from Argentina, 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, China, England, France, Germany, India, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Russia, Scotland, Spain and Switzerland.  This list includes the nationalities of all 
inventors that we found by hand-checking 625 patents of alizarin, indigo, azo dyes, and aniline, 
which Delamare and Guineau (1999) consider the most important dyes in the early 20th century.  
Inventors’ country of origins are identified through keyword searches for country names in the 
Lexis Nexis Chronological Patent Files, 1790-1970 (Figure 6).  For example, we assign a patent 
to be of a German inventor if it contains the word “Germany” anywhere in title or in the 
description of the invention.  
  Data on inventor nationality reveal that German firms quickly re-entered the United 
States after the war, despite the potential incentive effects of the TWEA (Figure 1).
14    
 
C. Measurement Error and Attenuation Bias 
                                                 
13 More generally, the lag between applications and grants has been shown to vary over time and across 
technologies, depending, among other factors, on the complexity of patent applications and the workload of 
examiners (Popp, Juhl, and Johnson 2004).  To measure the size of the lag in our sample, we searched the site 
www.google.com/patents for patents that include the word “dye.”  Google capped our search at 600 patents; 536 of 
these patents included application dates, and 493 belong to our sample.   
14 German discoveries in the 1920s and 30s include the production of insulin in 1922 (using pancreas glands from 
slaughterhouses), estradiol (progynone) in 1928, and Raschig’s phenol synthesis via the catalytic chlorination of 
benzene in 1935 (Aftalion 1991, pp.187-188).  According to contemporary accounts, Germany’s quick re-entry to 
chemical research was partly fuelled by war-time profits from the production of combat gases and explosives 
(Aftalion 1991, pp.138-139).   12
Our data may be subject to measurement error in the way we assign patents to inventor 
nationalities.  Specifically, we may overestimate the number of patents by domestic inventors if 
countries that are not included in our search patented a significant number of inventions; this 
error, however, is likely to be small.  Another type of measurement error results from using 
Optical Character Recognition (OCR) to identify patents by foreign inventors, because OCR is 
worse at recognizing misspelled names or untidy script than the human eye.
15   
Although there is no reason to believe that these errors vary systematically across treated 
and untreated subclasses, we hand-collected inventor nationalities of 625 patents of alizarin, 
indigo, azo dyes and aniline to check for systematic bias.  For these patents we identify 
inventors’ nationalities by carefully reading the full text of each patent.  A comparison of the 
hand-collected and machine-collected data reveals no significant differences in inventor 
nationalities across subclasses (Table 1 and Figure A1).   
Another type of measurement error results from our use of the USPTO classification 
system.  Specifically, inventors’ propensity to patent may vary across subclasses (Scherer 1971, 
Lerner 1995, and Moser 2009) and we may underestimate patenting in subclasses that are 
narrowly defined.  To address these issues, all regressions include subclass-specific fixed effects. 
Most importantly, however, the narrow definition of treated technologies at the level of 
USPTO subclasses may lead us to underestimate the effects of compulsory licensing: Our 
estimation assumes that treatment effects are limited to inventors in a specific subclass.  Given 
the narrow definition of USPTO subclasses it is, however, likely that some effects of compulsory 




  Results for our most basic regression 
 
Patents by U.S. inventors c,t = α0 +ß' TREATc ⋅ postTWEAt + γ ⋅ Zc,t + δt + fc + εc,t  
 
                                                 
15 To identify as many foreign inventors as possible, we search for the name of a foreign country anywhere in the 
document.  This overestimates the number of foreign inventors, if patent applications use the country name in a 
different context.  For example, we wrongly assign USPTO patent 1,674,085 to Great Britain, because its inventors 
(who came from Massachusetts) also applied for a patent in Britain and mentioned this in their patent document.  
Several cross-checks of our data, however, indicate that such errors are rare. Improvements in the quality of OCR 
over time will be captured by annual fixed effects. 
16 More formally, our estimation violates the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) because there is some 
interference between treated and untreated units (Rubin 1990, p.282).     13
suggest a high and statistically significant correlation between compulsory licensing and 
patenting by domestic inventors: In subclasses where domestic firms benefitted from compulsory 
licensing, domestic inventors produced between 0.118 and 0.234 additional patents per year after 
1919 (Table 2, columns 1-3, significant at 1 percent).  Compared with an average of 0.684 
annual patents in the average subclass after 1919, this implies a 15 to 30 percent increase in 
domestic invention.  Coefficients stay highly significant when standard errors are computed by a 
block bootstrap clustered at the subclass level to account for serial correlation in domestic 
patenting (Appendix Table A3).
17  Controls for patents by foreign inventors have a measurable 
influence on treatment effects, but treatment effects remain large and statistically significant.  
 
A. Controlling for the Intensity of Treatment 
Regressions with controls for the intensity of treatment indicate that effects on domestic 
inventions increase both with the number and the novelty of licensed patents.  An additional 
license increases domestic patents by 0.062 to 0.111 per year, equivalent to a 9 to 14 percent 
increase (Table 2, columns 5-6, significant at 1 percent).
18  An additional year of patent life 
increases the number of patents by 0.006 to 0.009 per year (Table 2, columns 8-9, significant at 1 
percent), which implies that licensing a new patent in 1918 (with 17 years of remaining patent 
life) adds 0.102 to 0.153 patents per year (17 years * 0.006 to 0.009 patents per year), while 
licensing an old patent (with just one year of remaining patent life) adds less than 0.010 (1 year * 
0.006 to 0.009 patents per year).
19 
 
B. Annual Treatment Effects  
                                                 
17 A potential problem with difference-in-differences estimation is that, in the presence of serial correlation in the 
dependent variable, standard errors may be underestimated even with clustering. For difference-in-differences 
estimations with a large number of groups a block bootstrap, which maintains the autocorrelation structure within 
groups by keeping observations that belong to the same group together in a “block’, has been shown to perform best 
(Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004).  Applied to our specific case, the block bootstrap maintains the structure 
of autocorrelations within subclasses, as it samples subclasses instead of observations.  We draw a large number of 
(79) bootstrapped samples (the computer crashed at 79), and reject the hypothesis that β = 0 at a 99 percent 
confidence interval (Appendix Table A3).  
18 Consistent with the idea that the marginal benefits of additional knowledge are decreasing, coefficients on the 
square of licensed patents are negative.  Taken to the extreme, this implies that, in subclasses which had already 
received more than 18 licenses, an additional license may discourage domestic invention.  In practice, however, 
none of the 335 treated subclasses in our data received more than 15 licenses.   
19 To control for differences in the quality of licensed patents, we also match our data with citations in U.S. patents 
between 1975 and 2002 (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 2001); 154 of our 699 licensed patents were cited at least once.  
Adjusting treatment variables for citations has no significant effect on estimated effects.   14
Consistent with the idea that compulsory licensing enables domestic firms to learn by 
producing, estimates of annual treatment effects suggest that the effects of compulsory licensing 
took several years to materialize.  In the regression  
 
 Patents by U.S. inventorsc,t = α0 +ßt ⋅ TREATc ⋅ YEARpostTWEAt + γ ⋅ Zc,t + δt + fc + εc,t 
 
where ßt measures the effect of compulsory licensing in year t, annual treatment effects for 
patent grants become statistically significant in 1927 (Figure 7, significant at 5 percent), 
implying an increase in patent applications around 1924, three to four years after most licenses 
had been granted.
20  The full effects of licensing, however, set in about five years later, in 1932, 
implying an effect on applications in 1929, eight to nine years after most licenses had been 
granted.  
These results match up with historical evidence suggesting that U.S. firms needed “time 
to learn” (Arora and Rosenberg 1998, p.79).  For example, the Winthrop Chemical Company, 
which had acquired all of Bayer’s patents and production machinery 
“could not figure out how to make the sixty-three drugs that were supposed to be (its) stock-in-
trade…The former German supervisors having been jailed or deported, nobody knew how to run the 
machines; …the patents, which were supposed to specify manufacturing processes, were marvels of 
obfuscation” (Mann and Plummer 1991, pp.52-53).
 21  
 
Once such obstacles had been overcome, the TWEA’s effects on domestic invention remained 
strong and significant throughout the 1930s.  After 1932, treated subclasses generated from 0.216 
to 0.513 additional patents per year, implying an increase of 59 to 88 percent in treated 
subclasses.  In 1939, for example, domestic inventors produced an additional 0.513 patents in 
subclasses where they had received a license under the TWEA.  
Controlling for the intensity of treatment further strengthens these results.  Regressions 
that control for the number of licenses confirm that the full effects of licensing materialized in 
the early 1930s, although effects were statistically significant as early as 1927.  In the 1930s, an 
additional license increased domestic patents by up to 0.213 patents per year (Figure 8).  
Regressions that control for the novelty of licensed patents confirm that the strongest effects of 
                                                 
20 For patents in our data, grants occur with a three year lag.  See the data section for a detailed description. 
21 The quick re-entry of German firms into the U.S. market, which dealt a powerful blow to U.S. production (Arora 
and Rosenberg 1998, p.78, Haynes 1945, p.521), may also have contributed to this delay.     15
licensing occurred in the early 1930s, although less precisely estimated treatment effects are 
observable by 1928 (Figure 9).
22    
 
C. Triple Differences and Placebo “Treatment” for French Inventors 
Triple difference regressions, which compare changes in patenting by domestic inventors 
with changes in patenting by all other non-German inventors allow us to control for 
unobservable heterogeneity across subclasses, such as the temporary absence of German 
competitors, which may have encouraged patenting by all non-German inventors, regardless of 
the TWEA. 
 
Patentsn,c,t =   α0 + α3USAn + α4TREATc ⋅ YEARpostTWEAt + α5USAn ⋅ TREATc  
       + α6USAn ⋅ YEARpostTWEAt + ßt ⋅ USAn ⋅ TREATc ⋅ YEARpostTWEAt + δt + fc + εc,t 
 
Triple difference estimates confirm that licensing encouraged patenting by U.S inventors, even 
relative to other non-German inventors.  In treated subclasses, domestic inventors produced an 
additional 0.065 patents per year after 1919 compared with other non-German inventors 
(significant at 10 percent), which implies a 10 percent increase.  The timing of effects also 
closely matches the results from our basic specifications.  Beginning in 1933, domestic inventors 
produced an additional 0.123 to 0.449 patents per year in treated subclasses (Figure 10, 
significant at 1 percent), which implies an 18 to 66 percent increase.  The true effects of 
compulsory licensing may be even higher, because the control includes a large number of British 
inventors who were affected by their own version of the TWEA.
23  Triple difference regressions 
that account for the intensity of treatment (not reported) further strengthen these results.  
An alternative (Placebo) test allows French inventors, who could not license patents 
under the TWEA, to benefit from the TWEA.
24  It estimates   
 
 
                                                 
22 We also estimate regressions with both binary and intensity-adjusted measures of treatment.  For example, we 
estimate Patents by U.S. inventorsc,t = α0 +ß ⋅ TREATc ⋅ postTWEAt + ξ Number of licensesc⋅YEARpostTWEAt +γ ⋅ 
Zc,t + δt + fc + εc,t., which confirms the results in Figures 8 and 9. 
23 In September 1914, the House of Commons passed an Act forbidding all transactions “that would improve the 
financial or commercial position of a person trading or residing in an enemy country” (House of Commons Debate 
08 August 1916 vol. 85 column 871).  In parallel with the TWEA, the British Act was extended in 1919 to allow for 
compulsory licensing.  The amended Act required “the Comptroller to grant a compulsory license under a food or 
medicine patent to anyone who seemed competent to work the invention” (Davenport 1979, p.81).  We include 
British inventors in the triple difference control to be conservative. 
24 Exactly 3,000 of the 164,500 U.S. patents in our data were granted to French inventors.    16
Patents by French inventorsc,t = α0 +ßt ⋅ TREATc ⋅ YEARpostTWEAt + γ ⋅ Zc,t + δt + fc + εc,t 
 
 
Results from this counterfactual regression reveal no measurable changes in annual patents by 
French inventors for treated subclasses (Figure 11), confirming that the effects of the TWEA 
were limited to U.S. firms. 
 
E. Intent to Treat and Instrumental Variables 
To test for bias based on selection into treatment, we estimate ITT regressions where 
“treatment” is defined as the number of enemy patents that were available for licensing under the 
TWEA.   
Patents by U.S. inventorsc,t = α0 +ß ⋅ Enemy patentsc ⋅ postTWEAt + γ ⋅ Zc,t + δt + fc + εc,t 
Results from this regression confirm the findings of OLS: Each additional enemy patent that was 
available for licensing increased the number of domestic patents per year by 0.054 (Table 3, 
column 1, significant at 1 percent), implying an 8 percent increase for each additional patent.  
Similarly, each additional year of patent life increased the number of domestic patents by 0.006 
(Table 3, column 3, significant at 1 percent) implying a 0.9 percent increase for each additional 
year of patent life.  These estimates are only slightly smaller than OLS (0.062 for an additional 
license and 0.006 for an additional year of patent life), suggesting that selection bias may lead 
OLS to under- rather than overestimate the true effects of licensing.
25 
IV regressions with enemy patents as an instrument for licensed patents confirm that OLS 
estimates are downward biased.  In IV regressions, an additional license adds 0.332 domestic 
patents per year, while an additional year of patent life adds 0.025 domestic patents (Table 4, 
columns 3-4, significant at 1 percent).
26  
 
V. Robustness checks 
                                                 
25 For binary treatment variables, ITT = TOT * P(treatment), where TOT represents unbiased estimates of treatment 
on the treated (Angrist and Imbens 1995, Wooldridge 2002, p.636).  Here P(treatment) equals 335/1341 (subclasses 
where U.S. firms licensed enemy patents/ subclasses where enemy patents were available for licensing), implying 
that unbiased TOT estimates would be 0.273 * 226/1,341=  1.089.   Because estimating binary treatment variables 
may yield inflated IV estimates if the “real” treatment is continuous (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996), we perform 
IV and ITT with continuous treatment variables. 
26 For a binary ITT variable that is uncorrelated with the error term in the second stage of the IV regression, the IV 
coefficient consistently estimates TOT as TOT= ITT/P(treatment).  In our data, this implies TOT= 0.0714/0.215= 
0.322= IV.  A Hausman specification test rejects consistency for OLS estimates at the 1 percent level under the 
assumption that IV estimates are consistent.   17
  This section presents a series of robustness checks, including controls for pre-existing 
time trends in patenting, broader class-specific effects, placebo treatments to control for random 
correlation in explanatory variables, and changes in the USPTO classification system. 
 
A. Controlling for Pre-Existing Time Trends 
One potential problem with difference-in-differences is that it may confound the dynamic 
effects of compulsory licensing with pre-existing differences in time trends across treated and 
untreated subclasses.  In other words, subclasses that were affected by compulsory licensing may 
have experienced an increase in domestic patenting after the TWEA due to differences in time 
trends that preceded the TWEA.  To address this issue, we extend our regressions to include a 
linear time trend for all treated subclasses for the pre-TWEA period: 
 
Patents by U.S. inventorsc,t = α0 +ßt ⋅ TREATc ⋅ YEARpostTWEAt + γ ⋅ Zc,t + δt + fc  
+φ⋅ TREATc ⋅ t + εc,t 
 
where βt measures treatment effects in year t and δt captures year fixed effect controlling for a 
pre-existing time trend φ ·TREATc· t.  Results of this regression confirm that patenting by 
domestic inventors increased significantly more for treated than for untreated subclasses after the 
TWEA, even controlling for pre-existing time trends (Figure 12).
27    
An alternative test controls for subclass-specific linear and quadratic time trends: 
 
Patents by U.S. inventorsc,t =   α0 +ßt ⋅ TREATc ⋅ YEARpostTWEAt + γ Zc,t + δt + fc  
+ φ1c⋅ t +φ2c⋅ t
2+εc,t   
In these regressions (not reported) treatment effects are also positive and statistically significant, 
further strengthening the results.
28  
 
B. Controlling for Time Trends at the Level of Main Classes 
                                                 
27 Regressions with quadratic time trends yield larger standard errors but nearly identical coefficients βt. 
28 To limit the number of parameters, we restrict the sample to 776 subclasses for the two classes with the largest 
number of licenses (8:bleaching and dyeing and 534:organic compounds containing a noble gas). 
An equivalent regression on the entire sample would require estimating 8,422 subclass fixed effects, 8,422 linear 
time trends, and 8,422 quadratic time trends in addition to treatment variables and controls.       18
  As an alternative way to account for the potential of differential growth paths across 
treated and untreated subclasses, we include interaction terms between year dummies and each of 
the broader 21 USPTO main classes.  
 
Patents by U.S. inventorsc,t = α0 +ßt ⋅ TREATc ⋅ postTWEAt + γ ⋅ Zc,t + δt + fc  
+ λmtYeart ⋅ Classc + εc,t 
where λmt represents a fixed effect for USPTO class m and year t.  Due to the large number of 
variables and interaction terms, computational constraints only allow us to estimate this 
regression for a 10 percent random sample of the data.  Results from this sample, however, 
indicate that estimates are robust to controlling for class-specific time trends (Table 5).
29 
 
C. Placebo Treatments 
We also perform more general placebo regressions to check whether our results might be 
driven by random correlation between explanatory variables other than the treatment.  
Specifically, we create a placebo treatment where the same share of subclasses (4 percent) is 
randomly assigned to treatment and re-estimate the most basic regression 50 times.  These tests 
indicate that random correlation across explanatory variables cannot explain the estimated 
effects; the hypothesis that the placebo treatment is significant is rejected for 45 of 50 placebos at 
the 5 percent level (Table 6).  
 
D. Dropping Newly-Created Subclasses and Secondary Subclasses 
Two additional tests address potential problems with the USPTO classification system.  
Most importantly, we account for the fact that the USPTO periodically adds new subclasses to 
accommodate new areas of invention.  In our data 2,737 new subclasses were added after 1919.  
Because domestic inventors could not patent in these subclasses prior to 1919, patenting 
increases mechanically in new subclasses after 1919, which may lead us to underestimate the 
true effects of licensing.   
                                                 
29 We also estimate regressions separately for all 21 main classes; class-specific regressions confirm that domestic 
patenting increased in treated subclasses after the TWEA.  In two of four classes with more than 20 licenses 
treatment effects were strongest in the late 1920s (8:bleaching and dyeing and 552:azides); in the two other classes 
with more than 20 licenses treatment effects were strongest in the early 1930s (534:organic compounds containing a 
noble gas and 548:organic compounds containing 5-membered hetero rings).    19
Regressions with a restricted sample of pre-existing subclasses confirm that including 
newly-created subclasses lead us to underestimate the true effects of licensing.  In subclasses that 
received at least one license under the TWEA domestic inventors produced 0.190 additional 
patents per year (Table 7, column 2 significant at 1 percent).  Compared with a mean of 0.310 
patents per subclass and year in the restricted sample this implies a 61 percent increase in 
domestic invention.  Regressions that control for the intensity of treatment further strengthen 
these results.  Each additional license increases domestic patents by 0.078 per year (Table 7, 
column 5, significant at 1 percent), and each additional year of patent life increased domestic 
patents by 0.007 per year (Table 7, column 8, significant at 1 percent).   
This increase in estimated effects may be due to the fact that U.S. inventors were lagging 
behind for much of the period and less able to generate inventions in new fields without access to 
foreign technologies.  U.S. chemists E.F. Hitch and I.E. Knapp concede 
“No matter how much we may dislike to be followers and not pioneers, we must, in the first few years, 
confine our efforts in this field largely to the manufacture of colors that have already been produced by 
foreign manufacturers” (cited in Hounshell and Smith 1988, p.90) 
 
  Another potential concern is that the USPTO assigns patents to several secondary 
subclasses (in addition to primary subclasses) to cross-reference related technologies.  Our 
analysis includes secondary subclasses because they are affected by compulsory licensing.  Their 
inclusion may, however, give too much weight to patents that were assigned to many subclasses.  
For example, 25 percent of patents in our data where assigned to at least four secondary 
subclasses.  To address this issue, we restrict the sample to the 6,740 primary subclasses in the 
data.  
Regressions for the restricted sample confirm results from the full sample.  In primary 
subclasses that received at least one license under the TWEA, domestic inventors produced 
0.031 additional patents per year after 1919 (Table 8, column 1).  This implies a 17 percent 
increase in patenting compared with an average of 0.183 of patents per year and primary subclass 
after 1919.  Controlling for the intensity of treatment further strengthens these results: Each 
additional license increased domestic patents by 0.025 per year, and each additional year of 
patent life increased domestic patents by 0.002 patents (Table 8, columns 2-3, significant at 1 
percent). 
   20
F. Treatment Effects within Indigo 
A final robustness check measures treatment effects within a specific group of chemicals - 
indigo dyes - which were disproportionately affected by increases in tariffs and the demand for 
domestic production.  In 1914, 90 percent of the U.S. demand for indigo was imported from 
Germany.  In 1915, Britain’s naval blockade cut U.S. markets off from German imports so 
effectively, that the last shipment of German dyes arrived in March 1915 (Haber 1971, p.185).  At 
the same time, the United States’ entry into the war increased demand for domestically produced 
indigo to create the blue shade of Navy uniforms (e.g., Navy Department 1917).  To encourage 
domestic production, Congress established a five-year tariff barrier in September 1916 (Aftalion 
1991, pp.123-124).
30  As a result, the price of indigo rose from 20 cents per pound in 1914 to 
nearly 70 cents in 1917.  While prices for other dyes recovered quickly to their pre-war levels, 
indigo remained expensive at 40 cents in 1919, double its pre-war (Appendix Figures A2 and A3, 
Haynes 1945, p. 231).
31 
This relatively persistent price increase may have encouraged innovation; if such 
innovation occurred disproportionately in treated subclasses, it will lead us to over-estimate the 
true effects of licensing.  Then, treatment effects within indigo should be much smaller than 
treatment effects for the full sample, because indigo was more affected by the demand shock than 
were other chemicals.  
  Regressions within a restricted sample of indigo patents, however, confirm that licensing 
encouraged domestic inventions.  In treated subclasses domestic inventors produced 0.027 
additional patents per year and subclass (Table 9, column 2, significant at 1 percent).  Compared 
with an average of 0.684 patents per subclass and year, this implies a 4 percent increase in 
domestic patenting within indigo, roughly comparable to the effects in the overall sample.  
Regressions that control for the intensity of treatment confirm these effects (Table 9, columns 1-
                                                 
30 Tariff protection continued throughout the 1920s and 1930s.  In 1922 the Fordney McCumber Act imposed ad 
valorem tariffs of nearly 30 percent on chemical imports; it covered indigo, alizarin and vat dyes.  In 1930, the 
Smoot Hawley Act raised tariff rates to 36 percent (U.S. Tariff Commission 1930, p.196, Eichengreen 1989, Irwin 
1998).   
31 Another reason to examine indigo separately is that indigo was subject to a technology sharing agreement, which 
may have transferred knowledge of German production processes to U.S. firms.  In November 1916, the British 
chemical firm Herbert Levinstein agreed to share with Du Pont its secrets of producing synthetic indigo dyes, which 
included knowledge that Levinstein had acquired when it purchased a confiscated British plant of the German 
company Hoechst (Hounshell and Smith 1988, pp.81-85).  Historical records, however, suggest that Du Pont 
wrestled with the problem of producing indigo for several years and succeeded “only after long experimentation” 
(Haynes 1945, p.245).  In addition to the within indigo test we also restrict the sample to non-Du Pont firms, which 
leaves results qualitatively unchanged.    21
3).  The timing of effects also closely mirrors the effects in the overall sample.  Annual treatment 
effects become stable and statistically significant in 1931 though there are some statistically 
significant effects as early as 1928 (Figure 13).  
  
VI. Firm-level analysis  
  As a final test, we analyze firm-level data for Du Pont de Nemours & Co. to shed some 
light on the mechanisms by which compulsory licensing encouraged domestic invention.
32  
Keeping in mind that our identification strategy is much weaker at the firm level, we compare 
the effects of Du Pont’s own licenses with the effects of licenses that were issued to other U.S. 
firms.  Licenses that were issued to Du Pont created learning opportunities for Du Pont, while 
licenses to other firms benefitted the U.S. industry more broadly.  For example, other licenses 
may capture changes in incentives to invest in skills and education or knowledge spillovers 
across firms. 
 
Du Pont Patentsc,t = α0 +ß1 ⋅ TREATDuPontc ⋅ postTWEAt  
  +   ß 2 ⋅ TREATotherFirmsc ⋅ postTWEAt + γ ⋅ Zc,t + δt + fc + εc,t 
 
Firm-level regressions indicate that both own and other firms’ licenses encouraged patenting, 
though own licenses had substantially stronger effects.  In subclasses where DuPont received a 
license under the TWEA, the company’s annual patents increased by 0.094 to 0.098 patents after 
1919 (Table 10, columns 1-2, significant at 1 percent).  In subclasses where other U.S. firm 
received a license, Du Pont’s annual patents increased by 0.021 to 0.025 patents roughly one 
third this effect (Table 10, columns 1-2).   
  Although these results are subject to selection bias, which may lead us to over-estimate 
the own-license effects, they match up closely with empirical estimates on learning-by-doing and 
knowledge spillovers in the late 20
th-century.  Such estimates suggest that firms benefit about 
three times as much from own production than from production of other U.S. firms (Irwin and 
Klenow 1994).    
                                                 
32 The data for this firm-level analysis consist of all 234 licenses and 1,618 chemical patents that were granted to Du 
Pont between 1875 and 1939.  We identify these patents by searching Lexis Nexis for all known variants of the 
company’s name, including E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., Du Pont Ammonia Corp., Du Pont Cellophane Co, Du 
Pont Everdur Co, Du Pont Fibersilk Co, Du Pont Film & Picture Co, and Du Pont Rayon Co.  This search yields a 
total of 3,571 patents in 241 classes and 5,716 subclasses; 1,618 of these patents are in one of the 21 classes that 
were affected by the TWEA.    22
Controlling for the intensity of treatment further strengthens these results.  An additional 
license granted to Du Pont increased Du Pont’s patents per year by 0.051, compared to an effect 
of 0.014 for other firm’s licenses (Table 10, column 3).  Again, both effects are significant, but 
the effects of a firm’s own licenses are about four times larger.  Regressions that control for the 
novelty of patents further strengthen these results (Table 10, columns 5-6).  For all regressions, 
Wald tests reject the hypothesis that treatment effects of own and other licenses are equal at 0.01 
percent significance.  Estimates of annual treatment effects confirm results at the industry level.  
The most significant effects of licensing set in around 1933, although effects set in as early as 
1927 (Figure 14, significant at 5 percent).  In terms of patent application, this implies that the full 
effects of licensing on set in 3 to 9 years after most licenses had been granted.   
 
VI. Conclusions 
  This paper has used the TWEA as a natural experiment to examine whether compulsory 
licensing encourages invention by nationals in nascent industries.  Data on chemical patents by 
U.S. inventors after the TWEA indicate that compulsory licensing has a strong and persistent 
positive effect on domestic invention.  In USPTO subclasses, where at least one enemy-owned 
patent was licensed to a domestic firm under the TWEA, domestic patenting increased by about 
20 percent after the TWEA (compared with subclasses that were not affected).  These results are 
robust to controlling for the intensity of treatment by accounting for the number of licenses that 
were granted and by accounting for the novelty of licensed patents.  Results are also robust to a 
variety of alternative tests, including triple differences (comparing changes in the number of 
patents by U.S. inventors before and after the TWEA with changes in the number of patents by 
other, non-German inventors), controls for subclass- and treatment-specific time trends, and 
placebo tests for other non-German inventors.
33  Intent-to-treat and instrumental variable 
regressions further suggest that the analysis may under-, rather than over-estimate the true effects 
of licensing.  
                                                 
33 Even without any effects on innovation, compulsory licensing may create significant positive welfare effects on 
consumers in developing countries as a mechanism to maintain product variety.  For example, welfare losses of 
extending patent protection to pharmaceuticals on Indian consumer have been shown to be substantially smaller 
under policies, such as compulsory licensing, that maintain product variety (Chaudhuri, Goldberg, and Jia 2006).  As 
a mechanism to address anti-competitive patenting behavior in domestic markets, compulsory licensing is expected 
to increase overall welfare by encouraging the optimal trade-off between incentives for R&D and the dead weight 
loss of long-lived patents (Tandon 1982, Gilbert and Shapiro 1990).     23
  The long-term nature of the data also allows us to examine the timing of such effects.  
Estimates of annual treatment effects indicate that the strongest effects of licensing set in around 
1929 (measured in terms of patent applications) and persisted throughout the 1930s.  These 
findings are consistent with evidence in aggregate data that total factor productivity increased 
during this period and that innovations that were developed between 1929 and 1941 set the stage 
for advances in productivity growth throughout the 1950s and 1960s (Field 2003).  They are also 
mirrored in changing patterns of scientific citations (e.g., Thackeray et al. 1985, pp. 405-407), 
which indicate that the U.S. chemical industry gained prominence as an originator of knowledge 
in the 1930s.
34     
  In addition the gradual nature of estimated effects, results from firm-level analyses 
suggest that learning-by-doing played an important role in encouraging domestic invention.  
After a painful period of experimentation, the U.S. firms benefitted from the ability to produce 
foreign inventions and were able to develop their own innovative capacity.  Thus, measured 
effects of firm’s own licenses are around three times larger than the effects of licenses that were 
granted to other U.S. firms (which may capture knowledge spillovers as well as more general 
effects, such as changes in incentives to invest in education). 
Although our analysis falls short of estimating the overall welfare effects of compulsory 
licensing on innovation, it is interesting to note that the development of the U.S. chemical 
industry after the TWEA closely mirrors recent experiences with compulsory licensing.  India, 
for example, permitted compulsory licensing for pharmaceuticals under its Patent Act of 1970.  
Under this Act, domestic firms had been able to produce generic versions of foreign-owned 
pharmaceuticals until January 1, 2005, when India complied with the WTO requirements to 
respect foreign patents.  Although there has been no systematic study of the effects of 
compulsory licensing in India, anecdotal evidence is suggestive.  Today, India ranks fourth in the 
production of pharmaceuticals and is the world’s leading supplier of generic medicines, with two 
thirds of its exports going to developing countries.   
To estimate the welfare effects of compulsory licensing, future projects should examine 
the incentive effects of compulsory licensing on invention in countries whose property rights are 
violated.  The recent experience of the U.S. chemical industry in reaction to compulsory 
                                                 
34 Based on citations in the top seven U.S. journals and the German journal Chemische Berichte.   24
licensing provisions in India and more recently under TRIPS offers a promising setting for such 
analyses. 
Finally, the difficult learning process that U.S. firm experienced after the TWEA suggest 
that human capital and tacit knowledge are essential in facilitating rapid technology transfers 
across countries.  World War II provides an opportunity to measure these effects: On April 7
th 
1933, Adolf Hitler’s “Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service” led to the 
dismissal of 1,100 scientists from German universities (Hartshorne 1937).  Many of these 
scientists moved to the United States in the mid 1930s, several years after compulsory licensing 
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TABLE 1 – HAND-COLLECTED VERSUS ALGORITHM-ASSIGNED NATIONALITIES 
Inventor Nationality  Hand-collected  Algorithm-assigned 
United States  241  290 
German   226  197 
Other foreign   159  138 
Total  625  625 
Note: Data from Haynes (1939), www.uspto.gov, the Lexis Nexis Chronological Patent Files (1790-1970) and 
www.google.com/patents.  To collect data on inventor nationality, we create an algorithm that performs keyword 
searches on LexisNexis.  This algorithm relies on Optical Character Recognition (OCR), which is worse at 
recognizing misspelled names or untidy script than the human eye.  To check for measurement error, we hand-
collected an alternative data set that includes all 625 patents for the most important dyes of the early 20
th-century 
(Delamare and Guineau, 1999): alizarin, indigo, azo dyes, and aniline.  In the hand-collected sample, inventors 
come from Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, China, England, France, Germany, India, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Russia, Scotland, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States. 
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TABLE 2 – OLS REGRESSIONS, DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS PATENTS BY U.S. INVENTORS PER USPTO SUBCLASS AND YEAR (1875-1939) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Subclass has at least one license  0.144***  0.118***  0.234***             
  (0.040)  (0.039)  (0.042)             
Number of licenses        0.088***  0.062***  0.111***       
         (0.026)  (0.018)  (0.024)       
Number of licenses squared        -0.005**           
         (0.002)           
Remaining lifetime of licensed 
patents              0.007***  0.006***  0.009*** 
              (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Remaining lifetime of licensed 
patents squared (*100)              -0.002     
              (0.002)     
Number of patents by foreign 
inventors (t-2)  0.301***                 
  (0.018)                 
Number of patents by foreign 
inventors    0.322***    0.321***  0.322***    0.321***  0.321***   
     (0.020)    (0.020)  (0.020)    (0.020)  (0.020)   
Subclass fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  530,587  547,430  547,430  547,430  547,430  547,430  547,430  547,430  547,430 
Number of subclasses  8,422  8,422  8,422  8,422  8,422  8,422  8,422  8,422  8,422 
Robust standard errors clustered at the subclass level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Data from www.uspto.gov and the Lexis Nexis Chronological Patent Files (1790-1970). Our data consist of all 165,400 patents between 1875 and 1939 in 
21 USPTO main classes that contained at least one licensed enemy dyestuff  patent.  These 21 main classes are subdivided into 8,422 subclasses.  Data on 
inventor nationality are based on a key word search for country names in Lexis Nexis.  Regressions that include a two year lag for number of patents by foreign 
inventors drop the first two years of data.  
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TABLE 3– INTENT TO TREAT REGRESSIONS                    
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS PATENTS BY U.S. INVENTORS PER USPTO SUBCLASS AND YEAR 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Number of enemy patents  0.054***  0.071***     
   (0.007)  (0.009)     
Remaining lifetime of enemy 
patents      0.006***  0.009*** 
      (0.001)  (0.001) 
Number of patents by foreign 
inventors  0.317***    0.317***   
   (0.019)    (0.019)   
Subclass fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  547,430  547,430  547,430  547,430 
Number of subclasses  8,422  8,422  8,422  8,422 
Robust standard errors clustered at the subclass level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Data from www.uspto.gov and the Lexis Nexis Chronological Patent Files (1790-1970) consist of all 
165,400 patents between 1875 and 1939 in 21 USPTO main classes that contained at least one licensed enemy 
dyestuff patent.  These 21 main classes are subdivided into 8,422 subclasses.  
 
TABLE 4 – INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE REGRESSIONS,  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS PATENTS BY U.S. INVENTORS PER USPTO SUBCLASS AND YEAR  
  First Stage  Second Stage 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Number of enemy patents  0.215***       
  (0.000)       
Remaining lifetime of enemy patents    0.344***     
    (0.001)     
Number of licenses      0.332***   
      (0.010)   
Remaining lifetime of licensed patents        0.025*** 
        (0.001) 
Subclass fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  547,430  547,430  547,430  547,430 
Number of subclasses  8,422  8,422  8,422  8,422 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Data from www.uspto.gov and the Lexis Nexis Chronological Patent Files (1790-1970) consist of all 
165,400 patents between 1875 and 1939 in 21 USPTO main classes that contained at least one licensed enemy 




TABLE 5 – OLS WITH INTERACTIONS BETWEEN USPTO MAIN CLASSES AND YEARS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS PATENTS BY U.S. INVENTORS PER USPTO SUBCLASS AND YEAR 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Subclass has at least one license  0.312**     
  (0.134)     
Number of licenses    0.132**   
    (0.053)   
Remaining lifetime of licensed patents      0.010** 
      (0.004) 
Number of patents by foreign inventors  0.305***  0.303***  0.303*** 
  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.051) 
Subclass fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Main class * year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  54,795  54,795  54,795 
Number of subclasses  843  843  843 
Robust standard errors clustered at the subclass level in parentheses  
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Estimated for a 10 percent random sample of subclasses, stratified at the class level.  In this sample, the 
average number of patents per year and subclass is 0.45. 
 
 
TABLE 6 - OLS REGRESSIONS WITH PLACEBO TREATMENT 
DISTRIBUTION of the t-statistic  t-statistic 
5
th percentile  -1.68 










  0.014 
Number of patents by foreign inventors       0.324*** 
  (0.019) 
Constant       0.154*** 
 
Subclass fixed effects 
(0.007) 
Yes 
Year fixed effects 
Observations 




Note: The placebo randomly assigns the same share of subclasses that are treated under the TWEA (4 percent) to 
the treatment group..  
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TABLE 7 – OLS, RESTRICTING THE SAMPLE TO SUBCLASSES THAT EXISTED PRIOR TO THE TWEA 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS PATENTS BY U.S. INVENTORS PER SUBCLASS AND YEAR 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Subclass has at least one license  0.206***  0.190***  0.276***             
  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.055)             
Number of licenses        0.145***  0.078***  0.111***       
         (0.032)  (0.025)  (0.030)       
Number of licenses squared        -0.012***           
         (0.003)           
Remaining lifetime of licensed 
patents              0.012***  0.007***  0.010*** 
              (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Remaining lifetime of licensed 
patents squared (*100)              -0.008**     
              (0.003)     
Number of patents by foreign 
inventors (t-2)  0.298***                 
  (0.019)                 
Number of patents by foreign 
inventors    0.329***    0.328***  0.329***    0.328***  0.329***   
     (0.020)    (0.020)  (0.020)    (0.020)  (0.020)   
Subclass fixed effects      Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects      Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  283,450  283,450  283,450  283,450  283,450  283,450  283,450  283,450  283,450 
Number of subclasses  5,685  5,685  5,685  5,685  5,685  5,685  5,685  5,685  5,685 
Robust standard errors clustered at the subclass level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Data from www.uspto.gov and the Lexis Nexis Chronological Patent Files (1790-1970). Our data consist of all 165,400 patents between 1875 and 1939 in 
21 USPTO main classes that contained at least one licensed enemy dyestuff patent.  These 21 main classes are subdivided into 8,422 subclasses. Subclasses 
created after 1919 have been dropped and subclasses not yet created have been given a missing value in the years that preceded their creation.  Regressions that 




TABLE 8 – OLS, RESTRICTING THE SAMPLE TO PRIMARY SUBCLASSES  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS PATENTS BY U.S. INVENTORS PER SUBCLASS AND YEAR 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Subclass has at least one license  0.031***     
  (0.019)     
Number of licenses    0.025***   
    (0.009)   
Remaining lifetime of licensed patents      0.002*** 
      (0.001) 
Number of patents by foreign inventors  0.188***  0.188***  0.188*** 
  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Subclass fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Main class * year fixed effects  No  No  No 
Observations  438,100  438,100  438,100 
Number of subclasses  6,740  6,740  6,740 
Robust standard errors clustered at the subclass level in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Data include all 7,513 primary subclasses in the 21 main classes treated by the TWEA.  Primary subclasses 
in this sample include an average of 0.183 patents per year.   
 
 
TABLE 9– OLS, RESTRICTING THE SAMPLE TO INDIGO PATENTS 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS PATENTS BY U.S. INVENTORS PER SUBCLASS AND YEAR 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Subclass has at least one license  0.044***     
  (0.015)     
Number of licenses    0.027***   
    (0.010)   
Remaining lifetime of licensed patents      0.002*** 
      (0.001) 
Number of patents by foreign inventors  0.004  0.004  0.004 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Subclass fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  46,670  46,670  46,670 
Number of subclasses  718  718  718 
Robust standard errors clustered at the subclass level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Data consist of all 843 patents in our data that contain the word “indigo.”  In the indigo sample, the average 





TABLE 10 – OLS REGRESSIONS AT THE FIRM-LEVEL, DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS PATENTS BY DU PONT PER SUBCLASS AND YEAR  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
Subclass has at least one license to Du Pont 
0.094***  0.098***         
  (0.014)  (0.012)         
Subclass has at least one license to other firms  0.021  0.025***         
  (0.016)  (0.010)         
Licenses to Du Pont      0.051***  0.059***     
      (0.009)  (0.008)     
Licenses to other U.S. firms      0.014*  0.009*     
      (0.008)  (0.005)     
Remaining lifetime of Du Pont licenses          0.004***  0.004*** 
          (0.001)  (0.001) 
Remaining lifetime of other licenses          0.001*  0.001* 
          (0.001)  (0.001) 
Patents by foreign inventors  0.030***    0.030***    0.029***   
  (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.004)   
Subclass fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  72,694  222,924  72,694  222,924  72,694  222,924 
Number of subclasses  1,913  5,716  1,913  5,716  1,913  5,716 
Robust standard errors clustered at the subclass level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The data consist of all 3,571 U.S. patent grants between 1875 and 1939 that include the word “Du Pont” or variations of the company’s name.  These 
patents cover a total of 5,716 subclasses; 1,618 of the 3,571 Du Pont patents belong to one of 21 treated USPTO main classes.  Data on patents by foreign 














































All subclasses Treated subclasses
 
Notes: Data from www.uspto.gov and the Lexis Nexis Chronological Patent Files (1790-1970) include all 
165,400 patents between 1875 and 1939 in 21 USPTO classes that received at least one license under the 
TWEA.  These 21 main classes cover 8,422 subclasses, 335 of which are treated.  Data on inventor 
nationality are based on a key word search for country names in Lexis Nexis. 
 
 














Notes: Data from Haynes (1945) and www.uspto.gov. The y-axis records the number of licensed patents in 
a treated subclass.  Treated subclasses are defined as subclasses that received at least one license under the 





















Notes: Data from Haynes (1945) and www.uspto.gov.  The y-axis records the total years of remaining 
patent life for all licensed patents in a treated subclass.  For each licensed patents, the remaining years of 
patent life are calculated by subtracting the patent’s age  in 1919 from 17 years (patent life in the United 
States in 1919).  Treated subclasses are defined as subclasses that received at least one license under the 
TWEA; 335 subclasses in our data where treated. 
 
 
FIGURE 4 – PRE-TWEA TIME TRENDS IN PATENTING BY DOMESTIC INVENTORS:  





































Treated subclasses Untreated subclasses
 
Notes: Data from www.uspto.gov and the Lexis Nexis Chronological Patent Files (1790-1970) include all 
165,400 patents between 1875 and 1939 in 21 USPTO classes that received at least one license under the 




FIGURE 5 – PRE-TWEA SHARES OF DOMESTIC INVENTORS: 
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Notes: Data on annual patents and inventor nationalities were constructed from www.uspto.gov and the 
Lexis Nexis Chronological Patent Files (1790-1970).  Treated subclasses received at least one license under 
the TWEA.  Data include 8,422 subclasses, 335 of which are treated.    
 
 
FIGURE 6 – EXAMPLE OF A U.S. PATENT IN OUR DATA 
 





















Notes: Optical character recognition is used to identify the inventor’s nationality for each of the 165,400 
patents in the data.  The algorithm searches both the title and the full text of each patent the Lexis Nexis 




FIGURE 7 – ANNUAL TREATMENT EFFECTS: TREATMENT =1 FOR SUBCLASSES THAT 





































Notes:  For a 95-percent confidence interval of the regression Patents by U.S. inventorsc,t = α0 +ßt ⋅ TREATc 
⋅ YEARpostTWEAt + γ ⋅ Zc,t + δt + fc + εc,t  , where TREAT = 1 if a subclass received at least one license 
under the TWEA.  Data include all 165,400 patents between 1875 and 1939 in 21 USPTO classes that 
received at least one license.  These 21 classes cover 8,422 subclasses, 335 of which are treated.   
 
 

































Notes:  For a 95-percent confidence interval of the regression Patents by U.S. inventorsc,t = α0 +ßt ⋅ TREATc 
⋅ YEARpostTWEAt + γ ⋅ Zc,t + δt + fc + εc,t  , where TREAT measures the number of licenses in one of 335 



































Notes:  For a 95-percent confidence interval of the regression Patents by U.S. inventorsc,t = α0 +ßt ⋅ TREATc 
⋅ YEARpostTWEAt + γ ⋅ Zc,t + δt + fc + εc,t  , where TREAT measures the total remaining years of patent life 
for all licensed patents in a treated subclasses.  Data include 165,400 patents between 1875 and 1939. 
 
 
FIGURE 10 – ANNUAL TREATMENT EFFECTS: TRIPLE DIFFERENCES  






































Notes:  For a 95-percent confidence interval of the regression Patentsn,c,t = α0 + α3USAn + α4TREATc ⋅ 
YEARpostTWEAt + α5USAn ⋅ TREATc  + α6USAn ⋅ YEARpostTWEAt + ßt ⋅ USAn ⋅ TREATc ⋅ 
YEARpostTWEAt + δt + fc + εc,t, where TREAT measures the total remaining years of patent life for all 






































Treated subclasses Untreated subclasses
 
 
Notes:  For a 95-percent confidence interval of the regression Patents by French  inventorsc,t = α0 +ßt⋅ 
TREATc ⋅ YEARpostTWEAt + γ ⋅ Zc,t + δt + fc + εc,t   where TREAT=1 for subclasses where U.S. firms 
received at least one license under the TWEA. Data include all 3,000 U.S. patents in treated subclasses 
between 1875 and 1939 that were granted to French inventors. 
 
 
FIGURE 12 – ANNUAL TREATMENT EFFECTS,  








































Untreated subclasses Treated subclasses  
Notes: The regression equation is 
Patents by US inventorsc,t = α0 +ßt⋅ TREATc ⋅ YEARpostTWEAt + γ ⋅ Zc,t + δt + fc +φ⋅ TREATc ⋅ t +εc,t    
where TREAT=1 for subclasses where U.S. firms received at least one license under the TWEA.  The y-axis 
plots coefficients for the year-specific treatment βt, and the year fixed effects δt  where a subclass is defined 
as treated if it received at least one license under the TWEA. Line for untreated subclasses represents δt, 





































Notes:  For a 95-percent confidence interval of the regression Indigo patents by U.S. inventorsc,t = α0 +ßt ⋅ 
TREATc ⋅ YEARpostTWEAt + γ ⋅ Zc,t + δt + fc + εc,t  , where TREAT = 1 if a subclass received at least one 
license under the TWEA.  Data include all x patents between 1875 and 1939 in 21 USPTO classes that 
received at least one license.  These 21 classes cover 718 subclasses, 127 of which are treated.  The average 
number of indigo patents in each subclass-cell is 0.035. 
 
 































Other U.S. licenses Own licenses
 
Notes:  For a 95-percent confidence interval of the regression Patents by U.S. inventorsc,t = α0 +ßt ⋅ TREATc 
⋅ YEARpostTWEAt + γ ⋅ Zc,t + δt + fc + εc,t  , where TREAT = 1 if Du Pont received at least one license in 
this subclass.  Data include 3,571 U.S. patents between 1875 and 1939 that include variation of the 











TABLE A1 ﾖ– TWEA TRUSTS BY NATIONALITY OF ENEMY 
Nationality  Number of trusts  Estimated value 
German enemies  17,339  326,855,090.39 
Austrian enemies   7,580    39,555,557.34 
Interned enemies      140      3,457,898.17 
American enemies      648    91,866,053.40 
Other enemies  1,567    40,371,354.63 
Net income from Treasury investments  -         839,770.82 
Total  27,274  502,945,724.75 




TABLE A2 ﾖ– USPTO CLASSES AFFECTED BY THE TWEA 
Class  Title  Licenses
534  Organic Compoundsﾗ—Containing a noble gas  133 
8  Bleaching and dyeing; fluid treatment and chemical modification of 
textiles and fibers 
47 
552  Organic Compoundsﾗ—Azides   27 
548  Organic Compoundsﾗ—Containing 5-membered hetero rings  23 
544  Organic Compoundsﾗ—Containing 6-membered hetero rings with at 
least one nitrogen 
16 
106  Compositions: coating or plastic  14 
546  Organic Compoundsﾗ—Containing 6-membered hetero rings with 5 
carbons and 1 nitrogen 
14 
549  Organic Compoundsﾗ—Containing sulfur hetero rings   11 
528  Synthetic resins or natural rubbers  10 
564  Organic Compoundsﾗ—Containing amino nitrogen  7 
562  Organic Compoundsﾗ—Persulphonic acids and salts  6 
536  Organic Compoundsﾗ—Carbohydrates and derivatives  3 
172  Earth working  2 
74  Machine element or mechanism  1 
101  Printing  1 
192  Clutches and power-stop control  1 
204  Chemistry: electrical and wave energy  1 
416  Fluid reaction surfaces (i.e., impellers)  1 
430  Radiation imagery chemistry: process, composition, or products  1 
568  Organic Compoundsﾗ—Containing boron  1 
570  Organic Compoundsﾗ—Containing halogen  1 
Note: Data from Haynes (1939) and www.uspto.gov.  Class numbers and class names refer to (main) 
classes within the USPTO classification system.  Classes are divided into subclasses, which are the unit of 
observation for the empirical analysis.  Licenses are the total number of enemy-owned patents that were 
licensed to U.S. firms in a given USPTO class under the TWEA.  43 
 







8 101 106 204 430 528 534 536 544 546 548 549 552 562 564 568 570
USPTO main class
Germany inventor Domestic inventor Other non-German foreign inventor
Hand-collected sample Machine-collected sample
 
Note: Classes are 21 (main) USPTO classes that received at least one license under the TWEA (see Table A2 for class names). Data from Haynes (1939), 
www.uspto.gov, the Lexis Nexis Chronological Patent Files (1790-1970), and www.patents.google.com. To collect data on inventor nationality, we create an 
algorithm that performs keyword searches on LexisNexis.  This algorithm relies on Optical Character Recognition (OCR), which is worse at recognizing 
misspelled names or untidy script than the human eye.  To check for measurement error, we hand-collected an alternative data set that includes all 625 patents for 
the most important dyes of the early 20
th-century (Delamare and Guineau, 1999): alizarin, indigo, azo dyes, and aniline.  In the hand-collected sample, inventors 
come from Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, China, England, France, Germany, India, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, Scotland, Spain, Switzerland, 
and the United States.  
 
 
TABLE A3 ﾖ– CONFIDENCE INTERVAL OF THE BLOCK BOOTSTRAP COEFFICIENTS 
Treatment coefficient   99% confidence interval  BDM test 
Subclass includes at least one license  0.0346864  0.1942624  99% 
Number of licenses  0.0203172  0.1149504  99% 
Remaining lifetime of licensed patents  0.0018647  0.0103889  99% 
Note: Data from www.uspto.gov and the Lexis Nexis Chronological Patent Files (1790-1970).  Our data consist of all 165,400 patents between 1875 and 1939 in 
21 USPTO main classes that contained at least one licensed enemy patent.  These 21 main classes are subdivided into 8,422 subclasses.  Data on inventor 
nationality are based on a key word search for country names in Lexis Nexis.  Confidence intervals are based on OLS regressions for 79 block bootstrap samples 
of the full data, these samples draw entire subclasses to maintain the structure of correlations of the full sample  (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004). 44 
 
























































Note: This series plots the ratio of the Bureau of Labor Statistics U.S. Index of Wholesale Price of 
Chemicals and Drugs to the U.S. Index of the General Price Level (NBER Macrohistory Series, 2007). 
 

























































Note: Price data from Haynes 1945 and Haber 1971, p.185. 
 